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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. It aiins at providiiig a socio-cconoinic pic- 
hlre of tlle candidate couiltries, on the oile liaild, stressing the large diffcrcnce in 
terins of staildards of living colilpared to the poorest  EU15 couiitries and the 
need for assistaiice. On the otlier, the paper wil1 concentrate on the crucial role 
of fiiiaiicial inarket developineiit in the process of catching up. Finally, it ana- 
lyzes two important issues that surround tlic ciilargeincnt debatc: capital account 
librralization and EMU incmbcrship. 
*  This paper  is based  o11  the  openiiig lcciiire of  the  Foitis Bank  Chair oii Januaiy 25. 
2001 I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper  adresses the fijture enlargeiiieiit  of the European Uiiioii 
eastwards, and tlie  opportuiiities  and  challeilges tliat this will briiig 
about. Given iny relatioii to the Europeaii Investineiit Baiilc, 1 should 
like to focus oii the ecoiioinic dimeiisioil of tliis process. More specifi- 
cally, I will concentrate on the fiiiancial  aspects,  even tliough  iiite- 
gration has inaiiy otlier iinpoi-taiit iinplicatioi~s  including politica1 and 
cultural olies'. 
Regarding tlie finaricial aspects, two broad issues are ltey iii the 
enlargeinent eastwards. Firstly 1  will underline the liuge surge iii the 
degree of regional disparities within the Uiiioil tliat will coine with 
eiilargeiiient. Bringing  the  staiidard  of  living  of new  ineinbers  in 
line with tlie rest of Europe will require substantial finaiicial assis- 
tance.  Secoiidly, I will try to  shed soine liglit  on the  debate  con- 
ceriiiiig tlie pace of financial sector integratioii. In particular,  I  will 
deal with (i) the timing of EMU meinbersliip and (ii) the impact of 
rapid versus grad~ial  capital accouiit  liberalizatioii iii the caiididate 
countries. 
This  paper  will  be  strucklred  as  follows.  Fii-st  I  sketch  the 
tiinetable  of  eiilargemeiit  and  tlie  characteristics  of  the  caildidate 
couiitries. In Sectioil 111,  I concentrate o11  the various diineiisions of 
reduciiig  the gap between the cuirent and fiih~re  EU ineinber coun- 
tries with a particular  empliasis on the role of the fiiiaiicial sectioii. 
Section IV deals with soine specific issues iii emerging fiiiaiicial inar- 
ltet developinent and their link to EU enlargeinent. The fiiial section 
of the paper sumiiiarizes the inain fiiidings. 
IT.  THE TIMETABLE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CAN- 
DIDATE COUNTRIES 
A.  Timetable aid coiiditions 
Siiice the collapse of coininuiiisin,  the prospect of iiitegration with 
tlie West has  encouraged  Eastern European couiitries to impleineiit 
far-reacliing  political,  instilxitioilal,  atid  ecoiiomic  rehsms  even 
before  they  fonnally  became  candidates  for EU  ineinbership. The 
desire to joiii the EU as soon as possible will continue to be a major 
impetus to reforins, including those concerning banking and fiiiaiicial iiiarkets. Agaiiist this background, a few reiilarks oii the timetable for 
EU enlargeineiit are usef~~l. 
The EU Luxeinbourg Suii~init  of  1997 opened the way for acces- 
Sion iiegotiatioiis witli the Czecli Republic, Estonia, I-Iuiigary, Polaiid, 
and  Slovenia.  Negotiations  witli  these  couiitries  started  in  1998. 
Following the EU Helsinki Suininit in December 1999, negotiations 
liave also started witli Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuaiiia, Roinania, and the 
Slovak Republic'. 
To becoine ineinbers of tlie EU, caiididate couiitries in~ist  f~llfill  a 
iiumber  of  political,  econornic,  and  institzltior?al  r-eqz~it*en?ents. 
Soinetiiiies,  these  requirements  are suininarized uiider  tlie lieadiiig 
"Copeilhageil  criteria".  The  European  Coiliinission  evaluates  the 
progress  in  ineetiiig  these  requireinents  oiice  a  year.  111  its  2000 
Progress Report, the Coininission confii~ned  that al1 applicaiits iiieet 
the politica1 requireineiits. 
With regard to  econornic requireinents, candidate countries inust 
be functioning inarket econoinies and they inust have the stnictural 
capacity to cope with the coinpetitive pressures of the Single Market. 
The Europeaii Coininission distinguished between four sub-groups in 
its 2000 Progress Report: 
e  Three countries -  Estonia, Hungary, and Polaiid -  were found to be 
market  ecoiioinies  tliat  should be  able to  cope with  coinpetitive 
pressures in the near term; 
e  the Czech Republic aiid Slovenia would also ineet the criteria in 
the iiear tenn provided that they coinplete reinaiiiing reforms; 
e  a  siinilar  judginent  was  made  about  Latvia,  Litli~iania, aiid 
Slovaltia, but the Report iiidicated tliat these countries iieed a bit 
longes to establisli tlie capacity to cope with coinpetitive pressures; 
fiiially, 
e  Bulgaria and Roinailia did not fulfill the criteria altliougli Bulgaria 
was credited for liaving made reasonable progress toward ineetiiig 
thein. 
Furtherinore, candidate countries must accept the acqztis commu- 
nazitaire and deinonstrate the capacity to iii~plement  it. The acqztis, 
wliich is tlie full body of EU laws and regulatioiis, is non-negotiable. 
So, the tem  inembership "negoriarions" may be sonietliing of a mis- 
noiner.  Wliat  is  beiilg  discussed  is  when  - aiid  under  wliich 
terms - countries  wil1 be  capable  of  implementiiig  the  complete 
range of existiiig EU law. In this respect, a coiitroversial issue is the grace periods that accession couiitries inay eiijoy before fiilly imple- 
mesiting the ncqz/is oiice they have joined the EU. The negotiatioils 
are  evolviiig  at  different  speeds  for  differeiit  couiitries,  but  are 
reported to be progressiiig faidy well. 
In suni, a variety  of  hurdles  reniaiii  to be taken before  Eastern 
European coiintries can joiii the EU. All caiididates have made con- 
siderable progress in prepariiig for EU meinbersliip aild they plan to 
be ready for meinbersliip by end-2002. Likewise, tlie EU has set eiid- 
2002  as  the  target  date  for being  ready  to  accept  new  inembers. 
However, experience with previous accessiosls siiggests that it could 
take  a  few  inore  years  for  enlargeineilt  to  beconie  effective. The 
broad colisensus today is that  eiilargeinent to a first group of coun- 
tries could take place at the earliest in 2004, possibly before the iiext 
electioiis to the Europeail Parliaineiit in Juiie, 2004. 
B.  Key economie j?figz/r)es 
The population is1  the ten Ceiitral  and Eastern European  candidate 
coiintries is 105 inillion, or some 28 percent of the populatioil in the 
EU-15. Also conceriiing laiid area, eiilargeinent would add 113 to the 
Unioii's  current surface. 
Bilt in shai-p contrast with the size in tenns of population or surface 
stailds the size of the econoiny. Aggregate GDP of Eastern Europe at 
inarket exchange rates is only soine 4lI2  percent of the GDP of the EU- 
15. Corrected for purchasislg power exchange rates the ratio goes up, 
but only to about 11 percent. Relatively low figures for GDP aiid rela- 
tively high ones for population have of course isiiplicatiotis for the stail- 
dard of living as measured by iiicoine per liead. Let ine give you soine- 
thing to beilchmark the staiidards of living iii Eastern Europe against. 
You  iiiay know that GDP per  capita in tlie Uiiited  States is roughly 
30 000 Euro aiid in the EU15 it stands at approxiinately 20 000 Euro 
(thus the average person has a yearly iilcoine of about 800 000 Belgian 
Francs iil Europe). What is tlie equivalent in Eastern Europe? 
111  1999 the  standard of  living  in the region raiiged froin  about 
1 420 Euro (tliat is only roughly 57 000 Fraiics) a year in Romania 
and Bulgaria, to only sonie 9 500 Euro (380 000 Fratlcs)  a year in 
Slovenia. The  uver.cige GDP  per  capila - ikat  is,  for the  Eastern 
European regioii as a whole -  curresitly ainounts to a meager 16 per- 
cent of the EU average -  reflecting nonetheless  already a beneficia1 
gain of 4.5 percentage points compared to 1993. It is woi-th to lteep in inind that these are two exceptioiis in Easteni 
Europe, ~iatiiely  tlie city regions of Prague aiid Bratislava. Only these 
regions perform as wel1 (Bratislava) or even better (Prague) tlian the 
curreilt  EU  average.  However,  in  some  caiididate  couiltries  (e.g. 
Roniania, Bulgaria aild the Baltic countries) real output reinaiiis even 
below tlie pre-trailsitioii level! 
A word about the economic structure. Iii Easteril Europe, agricul- 
mre contiilues  to be  far inore impoi-tant than in  the EU and iil the 
United  States. The sector accounts for 7 percent of GDP (coinpared 
to 2 perceiit i11  the EU aiid about  percent iil the Uiiited  States) 
and for 23 percent of eiiiployiiient (coinpared to 5 percent iii the EU 
aiid about 3 perceiit iii the Uiiited States). 
The inessages coiniilg from these coinparisons are clear. Regional 
standards  of living iii the caildidate countries are coiisiderably less 
than the EU-average. Even the Union's  lagging cohesion countries 
such as Greece or Porhigal scored better upon entering the Union. As 
a matter of fact, soine calculations suggest that regional disparities in 
an enlarged Europe will iiicrease the ratio of richest-to-poorest  froin 
1:5 to as inuch as 1:9. 
Fortunately. real GDP in Eastein Europe has grown at a good 3'1, 
perceiit a year over the last five years, aiid cui-reilt projections sug- 
gest ai1 increase iii the growth rate to 5 perceiit. While this is encour- 
aging, it nevei-theless  indicates tliat,  al1 thii~gs  equal, it would talte 
decades for the candidate countries to reach tlie living standards iii 
the EU. 
111.  REDUCING  THE  GAP  BETWEEN  THE  CURRENT  AND 
FUTURE EU MEMBER STATES 
A. Fiiqancing transition and ecorzornic developineiit 
Obviously, Easteiii European couiitries will continue to worlt towards 
a substaiitial iiicrease in their staiidards of living. On the one I-iaiid, 
this will require col~siderable  investineiit in tlie period ahead. 011 the 
other hand, domestic saving is liable to fa11 short of required iiivest- 
meiit given the current level of income in Eastern Europe. For 'oud- 
getary  reasons,  EU  grants  for  this  pui-pose  wil1  also  be  limited. 
Therefore,  exteriial financiiig will iilevitably reinaiii a major instru- 
ment to enhance the catching-iip process. There is, however, an iinpoi-taiit intertwined issue. With investii~ei~t 
exceeding  saving, iilcreasing  extenial fiiiailcing will  be necessary. 
Thus,  strong  movernents  in  the  capita1 account  will  unavoidably 
characterize  the  balaiice  of payineiits  of  Eastein  Europe. As  you 
know, tlie capital account of the balaiice of payineiits records purchases 
aild sales of foreign assets. Extei-nal financiiig inay induce upward 
pressure  on  tlie  price  of tlie  currency  aiid wol-sen the  coinpetitive 
position in international trade. But this should iiot cause too inucli of 
a concern as long as there remaiils a niatcliing curreiit accouiit deficit. 
When iinports exceed exports -  as is the case in Eastern Europe -  the 
deinand for foreigii curreiicies to finance tl-ie net iinports inay offset 
pressures 011  exchange rates caused by tlie foreign capita1 inflow. 
The  current  accouiit  deficit  for  Einergiiig E~irope  lias  increased 
from 2 percent of the region's GDP in  1993 to 5.4 perceiit in 2000. 
For the moment, I will therefore focus oii how these cui-rent account 
deficits have been fiiianced so far, that is, how inoveinents iii the cap- 
ital account have inatched thein. 
B. Foreigi savings: exterrzal deOt mar.7cets and capita1 inflows 
It is worthwhile to start witli a suininary of the inaiii features of exter- 
na1 financing in the process of traiisitioii so far. Iii the early years of 
transition,  official  flows -which  usually  ineans  supra-national sup- 
port -  accounted for most extenlal financiiig. This has changed over 
time,  however,  aiid  private  flows  have  becoine  iiicreasiizgly  lilore 
important. 
To be more precise, througliout the 1990s, around 88 percent of tlie 
external financiilg caine froin private sources, with only  12 percent 
reflecting the  activities  of official institutions  sucli as the IMF, tlie 
World Bank, tlie EBRD, the European  Conïmissioii,  aiid -  last but 
iiot least -  tlie EIB. 
Moreover,  in the  more  advanced  couiitries of Eastern  Europe - 
such as the  Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland -  private  flows 
inalte up virhially al1 of tlie extemal fiiiaiiciiig. This seeins to suggest 
that the level of private inflows is positively coi-related with progress 
in  ecoi~ûiiiic  ïefoïiïi~.  Bui liow art: these private flows in fact coin- 
poseci? Given the iinportaiice of private flows, it is indeed usef~il  to 
examine thein in more detail. Private flows can be broadly grouped iiito 
e  foreign direct iiivestment, 
portfolio investlilent, aiid 
e  baiik leiiding. 
Overall, emerging markets around the  world  (tllat  is  iil Europe, 
Asia, Russia, Latin Ainerica)  have  experienced a drastic jbll  in  net 
private  capita1 iiiflows  since the Asian  crisis  in  1997-98  aiid  the 
financial hii~iioii  that hit R~issia  iil 1998. Interestingly, capita1 flows 
into Eastei~i  Europe incr~eased  in  1997 and it  therefore  seems that 
tliese  couiitries  were  little  disturbed by  tlie  outbreak  of Asian  flu. 
However, this caniiot be said about the R~issian  crisis in 1998. The 
caiididate couiitries did not suffer froin net outflows -  as R~issia  aiid 
Asia -hut private  capital flows to the candidate countries haliled iii 
1998. In 1999 and 2000, they bounced back but still reiiiained soine- 
wliat below their 1997 level. 
In fact, the resilience of capital flows to Emerging Europe (exclud- 
ing  R~issia,  of  course)  has  been  largely  thanks  to  ai1  increase  in 
foreign direct  investinent  and  only  a relatively  modest  decliiie  in 
pol-tfolio investinent. Moreover,  in contrast to  other emerging inar- 
kets,  short-term  bank  lending  was  Iar  less  iinportaiit  in  Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, the amount of Gnaiice tliat foreigii creditors could 
withdraw qiiickly was liinited3. 
As I pointed out earlier, FDI has been lcey in the net private capi- 
tal  flows  towards  Eastern  Europe.  For  exainple,  in  1999  several 
couiitries attracted foreign direct investment tliat was almost as high 
as their entire current accouiit deficit. Iii the Czech Repiiblic, it even 
exceeded  the  deficit by  a coiisiderable inargin. But  wliy has  there 
been sucli an inflow of investinents, and is it a good thing? 
To a large extent, foreign direct investinent in Eastern Europe has 
been associated with the privatization  of state-owlied enterprises, for 
which  foreigii acquisitions  were  unavoidable.  This process  is  now 
almost  complete. But  also  "greenfield  investiiients" have  occurred 
and are liltely to contin~ie  with the prospect of EU membersliip. 
The continued growth in foreigii direct investment -  dming a time 
of a more difficult extenlal environment is very encouraging. These 
n ..  ~iuws  are instriimeiital for a sustainablc path of economic develvp- 
inent.  Like  exterilal borrowiiig, they  will  result  in  an  increase  of 
f~iture  potential output of  the recipient country. But  iri  contrast to 
external borrowing, foreign direct iiivestment project  will not bur- den the iilcoine  of f~iture  generations in tlie receiving co~intry  with 
interest payiiients. In light of this,  the  larger foreigil  direct invest- 
inent is relative to the current accouiit deficit, the inore siistainable 
this deficit will tui11  out to be. 
Another advailtage of foreigii direct iilvestinent is tl~at  it ilot oiily con- 
stitutes a stable source of external finance but also fosters tlie transfer of 
teclulology froin advailced couiitries. This ineans we ca11 draw coiisider- 
able coiiifort fioin the use of foreigii direct investmeilt to finailee a con- 
siderable share of cui-rent accouiit deficits in Easteixi E~irope.  Overall, I 
am optiinistic tliat foreigil direct investineiit wil1 contiii~ie  to play a sig- 
nificant role even wlien privatizatioii lias been accoinplished. 
C.  Tlie rele of the fì~iancial  sector":  obil li zing ond ollocafi~g  sn~~i~gs 
By stressiiig that extemal fiiiance will be iiecessary and ~iiiavoidable 
in Eastern Europe's  convergeiice process I have oiily presented half 
of the story. The fact that exteinal finaiice could offset any shortfall 
in doinestic saviiig does ilot imply, of course, that the level of domes- 
tic saving would be irrelevaiit for econoinic growth, oii the contrary! 
Let ine elaborate on this for a inoinent. 
Eiiipisical evidence  suggests tliat  ecoilomic  growth  is positively 
correlated with domestic savilig. There are at least three reasoiis for 
this. First, iiiteiliatioiial capital inobility is not perfect and, therefore, 
foreigii saving cannot fully coinpeiisate for a lack in doniestic saving. 
It follows that -  al1 otlier tliiiigs eq~lal  -  investment aiid growth are 
lower wheii doiiiestic savings are lower. Secoiid, swiilgs in exterilal 
fiiiance are not uncoiniiion.  111  these circumstances, domestic saviiig 
reduces the vulnerability of capital-iinporting couiltries to an abnipt 
reversal i11  capita1 flows. Tliis tends to enable a steadier path of eco- 
iiomic  growth.  Third,  doinestic  saviiig  itself  has  potential  to 
strengthen  a  couiitry's  creditwoitliiness  and  th~ls  encousages  the 
iiiflow of capital -  aild this at more favorable terins. 
Against tliis backgrouiid, it should be clear that it continues to be a 
priority for Eastern Europe to establish financial sectors that are effi- 
cient iii inobilizing and allocatilig saving. To fully appreciate how far 
Eastern Europeaii countries have advailced in establishing fiiilctioii- 
ing financiu! systems, it is useful to recal!  whcrc they started. 
Cei~t~aily-planned  economies  produced  inany  goods  aild  services 
that  did  not  differ  fuiidamentally  from  those  available  in  inarket 
economies. Here I ani thinking  of products  such as cars, electricity, and inacliiiiery. Cei-tainly, the quality and variety of these goods and 
services did not  reach Western standards. In  addition, tliere  was  an 
aliiiost  pereiinial  inismatcl-i betweeii  deiiiand  aiid  supply,  witli  ai1 
excess deinaiid for many goods aiid an over-supply of others. The ceii- 
trally plaiiiied systein was tlius clearly inefficient in allocatilig goods 
and  services.  Noiietheless  there  was  a  supply  of  cars,  electricity, 
niachiiiery, and the lilte, soinethiiig tliat caiuiot be said about "fiiiancial 
products and services" as we know tliem from inarltet ecoiioniies. 
In  a  inarket  ecoaoiny,  savers  provide  fiiiance  to  iiivestors  in  an 
exchange of a proiiiise to return these fi~nds  iii the fi~ture  together witli an 
appropriate rern~iiieration.  A relevant  issue hese  is tliat these proinises, 
whicli are exchanged in financial inarkets, are soinetiiiies broken. Risk 
assessineiit aiid maiiageineiit is tlierefore a cnicial part of the activity. 
Yet this type of inarket siinply did not exist in  ceiitrally planned 
econoinies. For sure, there were financial flows aiid payinents. But to 
the exteiit that financial flows accompanied investinent, tliey largely 
followed real resources that had been allocated earlier, uiider the cen- 
tra1 plaii. Thiis, iiidepeiideiit decisions on credit allocatioiis by baiiks 
were non-existent. 
Regarding  tlie  traiisitioii  from  centrally  plaimed  towards  iiiarltet 
ecoiioiny, priority has been given to grant autoilomy to goods produc- 
iiig coinpanies. The state withdrew gradiially froin interference in the 
prodiictioii process and allowed profít incentives to play a role. As you 
will undoubtedly know, in inoderniziiig the prodiietion process priva- 
tization played a inajor role, but also reiiioviiig entry and exit barriers, 
as wel1 as letting prices being detennined by supply aiid deinand. This 
was -  and iii some couiitries  still is -  a challenging task -  econoini- 
cally aiid politically. Yet, bear iii mind that tlie essence of such refonns 
areas "oiily"  is to iinprove the efficieiicy  of allocation  of goods tliat 
were already supplied before the collapse of coininuiiisiii. 
By contrast, regarding fiiiailcial products aiid services, soinething 
liad to be created that did iiot exist before. Iii light of tliis, the teim 
financial  sector  "refonns" is a bit  of an uiiderstateiiieiit  althougli I 
will continue to use it here. 
D. Financirrl secfor developnzen  f  in Eastern Ezu*ope 
Despite  remarkable progress  in  receiit  years,  fiiiancial  systeins  iii 
Einergiiig Europe reinaiii underdeveloped by inteiliational standards. 
A variety of iiidicators substantiate tliis observatioil. First, ,filinnciai dept17 -  ineasured as the ratio of broad money to 
GDP -  starzds nt arozrrzd  30 percent. This is ilotably only half of the 
level in Fraiice  aiid  Genilany. It  is  also  lower  tliaii  in couiltries  in 
Asia and Latiil Ainerica that have reached a similar incoine level. 
Secotid,  the pzrbiic  sector  still  absorbs the bulk  of' bnrzk  leridii~g 
aiid, as a result, lending to private entesprises accounts for a ineager 
10-15 percent of total leriding, which coinpares to  a share of more 
thai~  60 percent iii the EU. Even in the United  States, where capital 
inaskets are far inore iinportant for the finaiicing of eiiterprises tlian 
in coiitineiital Europe, the share of bank credit to enterprises in over- 
all bank lendirig ainounts to aroiind 45 perceiit. Wliat's iilore, private 
lendiiig  iii perceiit  of  GDP is  lower  tliaii in  couiitries  in Asia  and 
Latin Ainerica that have attained a similar GDP. 
Third, governnzent debt dominates dornestic bond mat*kets and so 
far tlie issuance of corporate bonds has been liinited4. 
Iii describing the creatioil of fiiiancial systeins iii Eastern Europe, 
let ine distinguish betweeii setting up a baiiltiiig sector aiid establish- 
ilig  non-balk fiiiaiicial  iiltennediatioii. Both  parts  of  the  fiiiancial 
system are important for fostering activities in the real econoiny. 
Clearly, a banlting sector that is guided by iilarltet forces is ltey iii 
allocatirig resources towards investinent projects in the most efficient 
way. 111 order to establish baiilcs that are guided by inarket forces, al1 
major candidate countries have eventually einbarked on privatization 
and foreign  owner.ship.  But  it iieeds  to  be  said  tliat tlie  caiididate 
countries pursued this strategy at different speeds and with more or 
less vigor, however. Let me give you a few exainples. 
Soine couiitries, Huilgaiy for iiistance, recogilized early tliat estab- 
lishing a inarltet-driven baiilting sector virtually froin scratch would 
beiiefit  froin opening tlie  sector to foreign investors. This has con- 
tributed to the transfer of baiilcing know-how, tlie recapitalization of 
existiiig batiks, aiid tlie creation of comnpetition amoiig baiilts. Let me 
illustrate tliis evolution. By tlie end of 1994, banks that were niajority- 
owned by foreigii banks accounted for only 20 percent of total baiilt 
assets.  Since tlieii,  foreign-owiied  banlts  have  becoine  iiiuch  inore 
iinportant: baiilcs that  are inajority-owiied  by foreign iiivestors ilow 
accouiit for arouiid 60 percent of baiik assets. Judged on the basis of 
a  40  percent  sharc  (rathcr  thân  the  i~î~joïity),  foïelgn-dominaled 
baiiks currently represent even up to 80 percent of bank assets. 
In other countries, includiiig the Czech Republic and Poland, pri- 
vatization started off slowly and foreign  ownership came in rather late  iii  the  traiisitioii  process.  But  since  tbe  mid-1990s,  this  lias 
clialiged. 111  botli couiitries,  baiiks  that  are iiiajority-owiied by for- 
eigii iiistitutioiis curreiitly account for inore than half of baiik assets. 
It  seeins fair to say that tliis belated move towards  foreigii owiier- 
ship lias been triggered by the desire to put tlie bankiiig sector oii a 
souiid  footiiig after years  of crises. Foreigii  iiivestors were  iiistru- 
ine~ital  in  reducing tlie cost of restructuriiig  and recapitalisilig trou- 
bled baiiks. 
Of course, i11  order to elimiiiate the hazard of a baiikiiig crisis, tlie 
baiiking sector sliould be effectively supervised and liave a sufficieiit 
aiiiount of capital to back up the risks tliat they are taking. 
Al1 caiididate  co~iiitries  have put  in place tlie core eleineiits of a 
legal  aiid regulatoiy fraineworlt  for the banltiilg  sector.  111 general, 
these fraineworks are i11  liiie with wliat  is being applied in the EU. 
However,  difficulties  remaiii  in  implementing  this  fraineworlt.  In 
part, this is due to a lack iii personiiel  traiiied  in bank supervision. 
But it is also because it is sometiines politically seiisitive to take cor- 
rective Ineasures when banlts have got iiito trouble. In  light of the 
disparity between the design and tlie iinpleiiieiitation of the legal and 
regulatory  framework  it  is  temptilig  to  say  that  banking  sector 
refoi~iis  iii  Eastern  Europe  have  been  exteiisive  b~it  iiot  yet  very 
effective -  at least in some countries. Not surprisiiigly, several coun- 
tries suffered severe baiilting crisis during tlie 1990s. 
Looking ahead, there continues to be a need for caiididate couii- 
tries  to  better  enforce  banlting  rules  aiid  regulations.  Differeilces 
between the EU aiid  caiididate  countries witli respect  to the effec- 
tiveness of baiiking regulatioil and supervision could distort coinpeti- 
tion and underiniiie the stability of banking systeins. 
Tlie second pillar of a fuiictioiiing finaiicial sector is coiistituted by 
non-bank financial i~iterinediation  -  niaiiily tlirough bond aiid equity 
iiiarltets. Al1  candidate countries have  advanced  i11  creating condi- 
tions for non-balik fiiiancial intermediatioii. 
Iii the context of iiiacroecoiioinic stabilizatioii programs, traiisitioil 
ecoiioinies iiitroduced strict liinits on ceiitral bal&  leiidiiig to govern- 
iiients. As  a  result,  governments  had  to  use  noii-inflationary  debt 
fiiiance to cover budget deficits. For this reasoii, Eastern Europe lias 
seen a rapid cievelopiiieiit of doniestic cuíïeíicy  bond ~narltcts.  Thc 
downward trend in inflatioii as a result of successf~~l  macroeconoinic 
stabilization has stirnulated the issuaiice of bonds witli longer maturi- 
ties and coiisequently yield curves have lengthened Nevertheless,  doinestic  capital  inarkets  are  still  underdeveloped. 
Gover1i1nent bonds  domillate  thein  aild  the  emergeilce  of  corporate 
bond markets is still in its infancy. Market capitalizatioii is low iiz  ilzost 
candidate couiltries. Likewise, tllere is a lack of  liquidity, wliicli -  in 
part -  reflects investors' preference for holding boilds to inah~rityj. 
The  further developineilt of  capital inarkets i11  Easteiil Europe  is 
likely to take time. 111 any case, it is debatable liow far these couiltries 
should go iii setting up tlieir owil capital rnarlcets. As these countries 
will integrate further wit11 the EU in the process of preparing for mein- 
bersliip iii tlie EU aild -  evenhially -EMU,  existilig and well-developed 
security and stock exchanges iil the EU-15 could cany out any level of 
non-bank financial inteimediation betweeii domestic savers and users 
of funds. Obviously, this  applies inainly to wl~olesale  intennediation 
aild it is in line with the move towards inerging exchanges that is gain- 
ing inomeiih~m  i11  the EU. It seeins eq~ially  clear that Eastern Europe 
has ilevertheless to fi~rther  develop the retail segment of tlzeir  capital 
inarkets with a view to inobilizing non-bank fiiiancial savings. 
As I have inentioned, external fiilance wil1 reinain crucial for the 
econoinic advailceineilt of Eastern Europe aiid progress towards EU 
inembership will help inaiiitaiii access to iiiternational capital mar- 
kets.  But  iny  view  of  the  overall  sihiatioil  is  that  additional 
priority should be given to fi~rther  strengthen domestic financial sys- 
teins to speed up the coilvergence process to tlie inaximum possible. 
IV.  SELECTED ISSUES IN EMERGING FINANCIAL MARIET 
DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR LINK T0  EU ENLARGEMENT 
Let iile tui11  now to  sonie issues that have entered tlle  enlargeinent 
debate, but  that  are  iil iny view  based  on  soine  inisperceptioils.  I 
should lilte to touch upoii two particular aspects tliat concern the link 
between EU enlargeineiit and the developinent of finailcial inarltets 
in  Eastern  Europe.  One  concerns  the  liberalization  of  the  capital 
account  of  the  balance  of  payinents.  The  other  goes  beyond  EU 
eillargeineilt aild  pertains  to  the  eveiltual participation  of new EU 
meinbers iii the European Monetary Unioil. 
I have poiilted out that ineinbers of the EU have to accept and iinple- 
inent  the  acquis  comnzunazrtaiïe.  You  inay  know  that  accessioii iiegotiatioiis  about tlie iinpleinentatioii of the  ncqwis are orgaiiized 
aloiig  so-called  "chopter-s".  Olie  of  these  chapters  deals with  the 
flow of capital between iiiembers. 
Here, the ncqziis stipulates that each EU ineiiiber is obliged to fully 
open  its  capita1  accouiit  for  transactions  witli  otlier  ineiiibers. 
Deviations froin this os aiiy other requireineiit are possible but nor- 
inally tliey are liiiiited iil scope aiid duration. For instaiice, in tlie case 
of severe balance of payments difficulties, one inay allow candidate 
couiltries to teinporarily coiitrol capital inoveineiits. Capital accouiit 
coilvertibility could also be restricted for cei-taiii types of traiisactioiis 
such as short-term capital inflows. Tlierefore, botli a caildidate couil- 
try and the EU need to exainine carefully wliat the desired speed and 
nahire of capital accouiit liberalization should be. 
To be honest, it is my feeling that i11 the case of Easteili Europe, 
enforciiig full capital convertibility too early would be a wrong way 
to go. Iii fact, I wil1 argue tllat it inay be ileither iii tlie interest of tlie 
caildidate  couiltries,  iior  in  that  of the  EU to  move  to  fi~ll  capita1 
account coiivertibility too quickly. 
Before elaborating oii this point let ine briefly review tlie current 
status of capital account liberalization iii Eastesn Europe. Except for 
fhe  Baltic  couiltries - aild  to  iesser  exten1  he  Lzeci:  Repitolic - 
candidate  countries maintain  controls  on  capita1 flows  other  thail 
those related to foreign direct  investinent. Hungary, for instance, is 
preventing the inflow of capita1 with holding periods of less tliail olie 
year. Nevertheless, al1 candidate countries have substantially disinan- 
tled restrictioiis on capital inoveineiits. In soine countries -  iiotably in 
Poland and Slovakia -  this went together with a inove towards inore 
flexible exchange rate ai-raiigeineiits. 
Capita1 account liberalization involves opporku~ities  and risks. On 
the upside, one inay note that exposing the economy to the scrutiny 
aiid verdict of international capital inarkets fosters ai1 efficieiit allo- 
cation of resources, and thus potential growth. Oii the downside, it 
needs to be bome in inind that ii~creasing  and possibly excessive cap- 
ital flows may give rise to two related problems. As I inentioiied ear- 
lier,  the  inflow  of  funds  creates  challenges  for  moiietary  aiidlor 
exchange rate policies that inay be difficult to inaster. Moreover,  a 
possibly abrupt reversal of capita1 flows not  only poses challenges 
for nioiietary aiid exchaiige rate policies but inay also uiidelmiile tlie 
stability  of  the  finaiicial  system  and,  consequently,  of  real  sector 
activities -  especially with a still fragile baiiking system. Just iinagine the followiiig scenario to push the point a bit fui-ther: 
The successf~il  iinpleiiientation of ecoiiomic refonns in caiididate 
couiitries  creates profitable  investineiit opportuilities. In  additioii it 
creates optiiiiisn~  -  even ex~iberaiice  -  aiid ai1 exaggerated assessinent 
of iiivestmeiit prospects. 
This could wel1 lead to massive capita1 inflows. Depeiiding on tlie 
excliailge rate regime one of two thiilgs is bouiid to happen. 
e  Under jìxed exchange rates, the inflow of capita1 is absorbed by 
the ceiitral bank, wliich converts it into doinestic cui-rencies. This 
teilds to iiicrease inoney s~ipply  that will iii turn put upward pres- 
sure  on  the  prices  of  goods  and services.  In  esseiice,  this  boils 
down to an appreciation of the country's veal exchange rate. 
e  Under flexible  exchange vates,  capita1 inflows  cause  a iiominal 
appreciatioii  of  the  countiy's  exchange  rate,  resultiiig  in  a  real 
exchange  rate  appreciation  even  in  the  absence  of  inflationary 
pressure. 
In sum, large inflows of capita1 will lead to a real exchange rate 
appreciatioii irrespective of the exchaiige rate regime. In this context, 
it should be inentioned that soine real appreciation of the exchange 
raies  of  ~ransi~ion  ecunornies  is  nomai - even desirabie - in  the 
process of catching ~ip  with more advanced countries. The literature 
oii international inacroeconoinics emphazises the so-called "Harrod- 
Balassa-Samzlelson"  effect,  i.e.  the  tendeilcy  of  real  productivity 
growth in tlie tradable goods sector and real exchaiige appreciation to 
go hand in hand. 
However, the saine literature  also points out that, with  excessive 
capita1 inflows, the real exchaiige rate may also overshoot its loiig- 
term eq~iilibriuin  path. This has, of course, implicatioils for the ciir- 
rent  account  deficit  of  candidate  countries,  as  iinports  become 
cheaper. Agaiii, cun-eiit account deficits as such are nonna1 for couil- 
tries that are lagging in teims of ecoiioiiiic developmeiit. Iildeed, less 
developed countries typically face cui-rent account deficits that iieed 
to be inatched by external financial capita1 inflows to eq~iilibrate  tlie 
balance of payineiits. 
In tliis explanation the train of thought was running froin current 
account deficits to tlie capital inflows. However, the overvaluation of 
real exchange ratcs may wideii c~irrent  accouiit deficits beyond what 
is sustainable in the long run. Sizeable capita1 inflows by themselves 
may th~is  also cazlse widening current account deficits. But too large curreiit account deficits make couiltries vulnerable to 
sudden changes in market sentimeiit. If sucli changes would inerely 
slow  down the  excessive  inflow  of  capital, there  may  be  little  to 
woi-ïy about. However,  sudden changes  in  market  sentiment  often 
result in ai1 abrupt reversal of net capital flows. The subsequent "nisli 
to  the  exit"  of  intemational  investors  niay  not  spare  even  sound 
econoinies. 
Tl-iis scenario has been proven to be realistic. 111  the last decade, 
there have been a number of financial crises that unfolded along the 
lines I have just described. What have we leamed froin these crises? 
The coinmoil storyline of these finaiicial crises in the 1990s seems 
to be that  a coinbination of  fixed exchange rates, fillly liberalized 
capital account trailsactions,  and  a weak  domestic financial  systein 
caii be  a recipe  for disaster.  The Asian  crisis, for instance,  would 
probably have been less severe, or would not have developed in the 
first place, if financial systems in these couiltries had been better reg- 
ulated, siipervised, and cusliioned. 
We know that the banking system in some Eastern European coun- 
tries is rather fragile. Against this  background, and with respect  to 
full capital  account liberalization, I would therefore like to suggest 
two ineasures that are in iny view required to smootli the road to EU 
enlargeinent. 
A first one has to do with transparency and informatioii. 
e  Irrational investment optinlicm and excessive capital inflows wil1 be 
limited  if  potential  iilvestors  come  to  a  realistic  assessment  of 
iiivestmeiit opportunities, tliat  is, when  asyimnetric infonnation  is 
reduced. To this end, it is important to improve tlie flow of infonna- 
tion to the inarltet. For instance, iiivestors need to be wel1 informed 
abo~it  (i) key econoinic developineilts, (ii) accountiiig, auditing, aiid 
disclosure staildards, (iii) corporate govemance, (iv) banluuptcy pro- 
cedures, (v) and financial sector regulation and supervision. 
e  Infonnation has  at least  two  dimensions - quantity and  quality. 
Enhancing the quantity of infonnation  on the econoinic strengths 
aild weaknesses of countries, coinpanies, and financial systeins is 
certainly important for taking scnsiblc investincnt decisions. But 
more is not ilecessarily better. It is therefore equally important to 
enhance the  quality  of  infonnation  and  to provide  a beiichmark 
against which to judge the sihlation in a particular countiy. 111  the aftei~nath  of the fiilailcial crisis of the late  1990s, inultilat- 
era1 institutioi~s  such as tlie IMF, the BIS, and the OECD have been 
puttiilg nlore eiilphasis on tlie need to malte fi~rther  pi-ogress iii these 
areas. 
A second measure has to do wit11  the bankiilg  and  non-batiking 
financial system. As 1 Iiave covei-ed this before, I will only recap tlie 
inain tasks, which -  I  tliink -  will be pursued inore vigorously as 
countries prepare for accession. It is essential to harmollize tlie regu- 
lation aild s~~pervisioil  of fiilancial sectors in the EU-15 and iil candi- 
date countries and to effectively iinplemeilt them in both bank aild 
non-bank financial sectors. 
So, putting these pieces together, what can we say iii the end about 
tlie  speed and seq~iencing  of f~~rther  capita1 account liberalization? 
1  regard improvements in the area of transpareiicy and of finaileial 
sector regulation  and  s~ipervisioil  as absolutely  essential for f~~rther 
liberalizing  capital accoiint trailsactions. Moreover,  I see rislts with 
opeiliilg the capita1 account further as long as curreilt account deficits 
of candidate countries are in excess of, say, 4 to 5 percent of GDP. As 
I  inentioned earlier,  the  current  account  deficit  currently  stands at 
some 5 percent on average, coming froii? oiily 2 in 1993. 
Consequently, 1 think it is fair to say that progress in improviiig 
transpareiicy, i11  strengtheiling fiilancial sectors, and in red~icing  cur- 
rent  account  deficits  to  sustainable  levels  are  a  preconditioii  for 
reinoving reinaiiiing controls o11  short-term capita1 inovements. Or, in 
other words, it would be sensible to grant caildidate countries tempo- 
rary exeinptions regarding the criterion of fi~ll  liberalizatioil of capi- 
tal accouilt transactions between current aild new EU inembers. This 
would be  in the interest of both the caildidate aild the  current EU 
meinbers. 
B. A ~)ord  on joininy Ezii-opean Monetavy  Union 
Let ine finish here wit11  a word oii joining  EMU. Recall that EMU 
menlbership would require a fixed exchailge rate betweeii caildidate 
countries'  cui-reilcy  aiid  the  Euro.  Consequently,  this  would  inean 
giving  up  a policy  iilstruinent  by  the  candidate  countries.  Is  this 
liltely to happen iii tlie iiear futLiïe? 
Accession to the EU does ilot autoinatically imply meinbership in 
EMU. As I have pointed out before, to join the Unioil, candidate coun- 
tries have to ineet a variety  of political,  economie  and  instihitional criteria - the  so-called  "Copeiiliageii  criteria" - and  they  have  to 
accept  aiid  impleineiit tlie  acqziis conzrizuriaz~tair-e.  By  accepting tlie 
ncqliis, caiididate co~intries  make a coinrnitinent to ainz at EMU mem- 
bership. Therefore, in coiitrast to Deiiinark and tlie Uiiited Kiiigdom, 
these is no  opt-out for Eastern Europeaii couiitries regarding EMU. 
But it is a n7ispercepfion that EMU ineiliberchip will follow ilnrizeu'i- 
afely  aild azrtor?~ntically.  To join EMU, countries first have to be mein- 
bers of tlie EU aiid, secoiid, they have to fùlfill the "Maastricht" con- 
vergeilce criteria. 
Is it theii possible to conjecture tlie earliest date by which Eastern 
E~iropean  countries would be able to join EMU? 
Here, we have to take  iiito  account the  Maastricht  criterion that 
coiicerns a country's exchange rate. This criterion requires, first, that 
a meinber of tlie EU inust participate i11 the European Exchange Rate 
Mechaiiism (ERM 11)  and, second, that its exchange rate iiiust have 
stayed for at least two years withiii tlie margin of fluctuation pesmit- 
ted  in ERM without a devaluation  of the parity to the euro. If this 
logic applies, candidate countries inay join EMU oilly two years after 
they have become iiieinbers of tlie EU. Provided  that the potential 
EMU meinbers  also fulfill the otlier Maastricht  criteria, and talting, 
say, 2004 as the year wheii tlie fïrst couiltries join  the EU, then the 
earliest year of participation in EMU would be 2006. 
But before considering wliether this is at al1 realistic, let us think 
for a inoineiit about the  consequences of joining  EMU  as  early  as 
possible. I will confine inyself to a few remarks. 
First, althougli most countries in Eastern Europe have made strides 
in achieviilg ~nacroeconoinic  stability, it is sometiines argued that this 
achievement is easier to secure by joining EMU. This would help sta- 
bilize  iiiflationary  expectatioils  at  a  low  level,  wliich  -  in 
kin1 -  reduces interest rates. Fui-tl~ennore,  joiiiing EMU would eliiii- 
iilate the currency risk for transactions in the euro-zone, ~vliich  also 
teiids to reduce interest rates. Overall, this has potential to stimulate 
real ecoiioinic activity. 
Second, downward pressure  on interest rates  caii be expected to 
coininence in the period leadiiig up to EMU participation. This has 
happened  i11  couiitries such as Italy prior to tlie  launch of EMU in 
1999 and we have  witiiessed the saliie evolution iii Greecc, as this 
country was getting closer to joining EMU. 
Third, quite independent froin a decliiie iii exchange rate rislts, the 
coiifideiice in econoinies that are getting ready for EMU inay rise, leadiiig to both  a decline in country risk preiiiia and an  iiicrease iii 
capital  inflows.  Decliiiiiig  country  risk  preinia  are  unainbiguously 
betieficial for Eastern Europe. To soiiie exteiit this is already happeii- 
ing  in  several  of  the  calididate  countries  as  they  make  progress 
towards EU metiibership. For iiistance, iii recent years, rating agen- 
cies have upgraded countries such as Huiigary aiid Polaiid. Provided 
that couiltries reinain on tlie road to EU aiid EMU, fin-ther upgrading 
is likely to coine. 
Iii fact, al1 this boils down to a cheaper price for boirowiiig money, 
aiid -  with iioii-zero price  elasticity -  in a greater capita1 flows. As 
discussed before,  capital  inflows  are  geiierally beiieficial  but  iiiay 
create problems  for inoiietary  andlor exchaiige rate policies  if they 
are  excessive.  It  would  be  erroneous  to  coiiclude  that  difficulties 
would vaiiisli after countries have joined EMU. 
By definition, capital inoveineiits within the euro-zone caimot lead 
to a iioininal exchange rate appreciatioii, for exchange rates have dis- 
appeared  in  the  EMU.  However,  higher  rates  of  inflation  in  tlie 
regions of the euro-zone that are subject to a inassive influx of capi- 
tal  are possible.  By consequence,  real  exchange  rate  appreciatioiis 
may  still  occur. Probably  more  iinportaiit, liowever,  with  massive 
capita1 iiiilows  iiito  the  financial  systeins  of  caiididate  countries, 
there is a risk tliat too much finaiice is chasing a liinited nuinber of 
profitable investment opportuiiities. In the absence of properly regu- 
lated financial sectors and adequate investment appraisal capabilities, 
investineiit in low-quality projects inay thrive. In suiii, irrational exu- 
beraiice does not disappear with EMU. 
Finally, the lauilcli of the euro in  1999 lias fostered  a shift froin 
baiik  to  financial  marltet  intermediation.  An  iiicreasiiig iiuinber  of 
corporates  inobilize  financial  resources  for  their  investineiit  now 
directly  via  bond  inarkets,  instead  of  usiiig  bank  credit,  as  tliis 
reduces tlie cost of debt fiiiaiice for these firins. Extendiiig EMU to 
Eastei~i  Europe inay tlius help develop doiiiestic coi-porate bond inar- 
ltets,  which  as  of  now  are  virtually  noii-existent.  Iroiiically,  tlie 
already fragile banlting sector in Eastern Europe inay lose territoiy to 
fiiiaiicial inarkets ilot long after having been established. 
Is early meinbership of Emergiiig Europe in EMU feasible? When 
Europe dcbatcd the pros and cons of EMU iii tlie 1990s, rnrrch atten- 
tion ceiitered oii whether the union was an "optiiilal cuneiicy area" 
and oii how  EMU-members could  suffer Erom  asyrnmetric  shocks. 
The argument was the following. In tlie case of asyminetric shocks, couiltries that are outside the EMU cal1 still resort to exchange rate 
changes to adjust to tliese shocks. 
Now,  differences  between  the  ecoiioinic  stixcture  of  Eastenl 
Europe aiid tlie EU-1  5  seeiu to be larger thail differeiices withiii the 
EU. It follows that the questioii of asyininetric slioclts iiiay be veiy 
relevant  wheii  weighiiig the  pros  and  cons  of  exteilding EMU  to 
Eastei-n Europe. 
I will, however, iiot deal with this questioii here but ratlier address 
a more basic one. To  set the stage for the arguineilt, let me recall an 
obseivation tliat I have made a coiiple of tinies, iiainely: in  catching 
up witli living standards elsewhere in the world, less developed coun- 
tries, such as EnIerging Europe, wil1 experience an appreciatioii of 
their real exchailge rates. As I meiitioned before, this inay largely be 
drive11 by the  so-called Hairod-Balassa-Sainuelson effect,  and you 
will  reineinber  that  this  essentially  reflects  strong  productivity 
growth in traded goods sectors of less developed countries. 
But what is iinportant in the context of discussing whether early 
EMU meinbership  is realistic  is the  following: a real  appreciation 
involves  either a nomina1 appreciation or a positive inflation differ- 
ential between Eastesn Europe and the EU, or a combinatioil of both. 
This is liable to be  in conflict wit11  the Maastl-iclit  criteria. 
1  already inentioiled the Maastricht criterion that calls for the nom- 
inal exchange rate of a potential EMU participant to stay for at least 
two years within the inargin of fluctiiation permitted  in ERM. If a 
potential EMU ineinber wants to keep its exchange rate in that inar- 
gin, a nomina1 exchange rate appreciatioii is ruled out as ineans of 
appreciatiilg its currency in real tenns. 
This leaves tlie option of toleratiilg a rate of inflation that is Iiigl-ier 
tllan in the EU. However, this is liltely to be in conflict with aiiother 
ltey Maastricht criterion, nainely the obligation that the inflation rate 
of ai1 EMU caildidate inust not deviate by more than 1.5 percent from 
the rate of inflation of the three best perfoimers iii tlie EU. 
It th~is  traiispires that meeting the Maastricht criteria -  the iiiflatioii 
target iii particular -  inay be in conflict with the real adjustinent that 
Eastei-n Europe still has to complete and there is thus a risk of join- 
ing  EMU  too  early. Agaiilst  this  baclcground, candidate  countries 
liave been granted flexibility as to the timing of EMU menibersliip. 
In coi~clusion,  there are reasoiis to consider that early EMU inem- 
bership  is not  a priority  in the  eiilargement process.  The move to 
inore flexible exchange rate ai-rangements as in Poland, for instance, is not necessai-ily in conflict with the aiin of joiiiiilg EMU. In fact, the 
possibility of cliai-igiiig exchange rates inay coilstrain short-term cap- 
ital inflows, thus removing olie reasoiz for exchange rate instability. 
This could smooth the road to EMU. 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
111  this paper, I have show11 that the caildidate couiltries are charac- 
terized by  a huge iilcoine-gap vis-à-vis  the cuneilt Meinber  States. 
Closiilg  this  gap  requires  coiisiderable  investineiit  iii  the  period 
ahead, but domestic saviilg is lilcely to fa11  short of req~lired  iilvest- 
inent  given  the  level  of  iilcoine  in  Easteiil Europe.  Thus, Eastenl 
Europe is depeiidant on external financiilg. 
Foreign  direct  iiivestinent has  been  substantial,  aild  should  con- 
tinue to play an iinportailt role here. But, FDI iniglit not be sufficient, 
so that  a substantial lielping hand  froin  official  external  financiilg 
remaiils desirable. Above all, domestic fiiiailce wil1 reinain essential 
too, aild it is my view that priority should precisely be given to a f~lr- 
tlier developinent  aild  strengthei~ing  of the  domestic  financial  sys- 
tems, botli bankii~g  and non-banlting. 
At the saine tiine, the road towards EU inembership implies chal- 
lenges and rislts. As Eastern Europe gets closer to EU meinbership, 
iiltegration  wil1  becoine  stronger,  especially  iil  the  finaiicial 
sphere. To reduce the risks, it is advisable to give careful considera- 
tion to the scope aiid tiining of further capita1 accouizt liberalization. 
The same should apply to the timing of EMU ineinbership. 
IVO TES 
1.  For a good revicw of the political  and culh~ral  aspects, see a.o. F.  Dram :"Uil élar- 
gisscmeiit pas coiniiie les autres..  ..Réflexion sur les spécificités  des pays caiididats 
I'Europe  centrale ct orieiltale",  Arotre  Elrrope, Ehtc/es et recherrlies  11, Nov. 2000. 
2.  Tlicre are three otlicr caildidate couiitries : Malta, Cyprus aiid Turkey. But tliis lectiire 
deals oiily with the teil Ceiitral aiid Eastem Europcan candidate coiiiitries. 
3.  For coinpleteiiess, it should be said tliat tlie ilet oiitilow of bank loaiis that did occur 
Iiad already coinniciiced in 1996 -  i.c. before ecoiioinic probleins  iii Asia aiid Russia 
i~iadc  licadlincs. Analysts have attrib~ited  this iiet outflow iii baiik Ienclirig to thc strut- 
egy of baks  in iiiatul-e niai-kets. Ranlcs warited to rcduce thcir exposure to ciiicrging 
markcts, including Easterii  Europe. Aiid, of course, the financial  crises of thc late 
1990s accelerated tliis move. 
4. To  illustrate  this point  let  US  look at bond inarkets in  Huiigary,  Polaild, tlie  Czccli 
Republic, and i11  tlie  Slovak Republic. Ti1  Hungary  and Poland, goveiuiiiciit  boiids (issued mainly by the central  goveimilent but  also by  ii~uiiicipalities)  a~id  eeasury 
bills account for aliuost  100 percent of the valuc of outstanding bonds. In tlie Czech 
Republic and i11  Slouakia, respectively, tbc govenlinent share is estiniated at 66 per- 
cent  arid  74 percent,  respectively.  Howcy.ler,  tliis  uilderstaics  ihe dominante  of tlie 
statc. Tliis is because tlie ren~aiiting  34 percent and 76 percent. respectively,  includc 
bonds tliat are state-guarautecd  andlor have been iss~icd  by  state-owned  enterprises. 
5.  To  give  an idea wliere  to sit~iate  tlie  progress  in  capita1 inarkets refoiins  in  Easteni 
Europe  I'd like to ineiitioii  tlie  EBRD index tliat  rncasures  this  proccss. Tliis  index 
ranges from oue  to  fo~ir  and a third, aiid takcs a value of two ior couilh-ies sucli as 
Bulgaria and Roiua~iia.  The leaders i11 tliis area are I-lungaiy a~id  Poland with a score of 
tliree and a third. Compared to advanccnients in otlier refoi-in areas -  such as privatiza- 
tion, pricc and trade liberalization, and bariking qapital inarket reforiiis are clearly run- 
ilirig beliind. 